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Abstract
Miniaturization of computer hardware and the demand for network capable devices has
resulted in the emergence of a new class of technology called wearable computing. Wear-
able devices have many purposes like lifestyle support, health monitoring, fitness monitor-
ing, entertainment, industrial uses, and gaming. Wearable devices are hurriedly being
marketed in an attempt to capture an emerging market. Owing to this, some devices do not
adequately address the need for security. To enable virtualization and connectivity wearable
devices sense and transmit data, therefore it is essential that the device, its data and the
user are protected. In this paper the use of novel Integrated Circuit Metric (ICMetric) technol-
ogy for the provision of security in wearable devices has been suggested. ICMetric technol-
ogy uses the features of a device to generate an identification which is then used for the
provision of cryptographic services. This paper explores how a device ICMetric can be gen-
erated by using the accelerometer and gyroscope sensor. Since wearable devices often
operate in a group setting the work also focuses on generating a group identification which
is then used to deliver services like authentication, confidentiality, secure admission and
symmetric key generation. Experiment and simulation results prove that the scheme offers
high levels of security without compromising on resource demands.
1 Introduction
Recently there has been a rapid increase in the number internet capable devices. A paradigm
shift in computing has caused rapid development of personal devices. The latest trend in com-
puting aims to interconnect sensors, devices, embedded systems, software and hardware to
collect and exchange data. The Internet of Things (IoT) allows devices to connect to the inter-
net thus creating a ubiquitous environment where devices share data and information for
increased connectivity. IoT devices comprise an embedded system with valuable data which is
being communicated often via short range wireless signals like Bluetooth. The IoT is a dense
population of interconnected smart devices like smartphones, televisions, vehicles, health
monitoring devices, home automation systems and wearable devices to name a few.
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Interconnectivity, varying purpose and capability creates a compelling case for ensuring secu-
rity and safety of devices in the IoT to protect the users data and privacy.
Wearable computing is an area that is closely related to pervasive and ubiquitous comput-
ing. Consumer wearable devices are being marketed that can be worn on the body for both
business and personal use. What sets the wearable technology apart from conventional mobile
devices is the fact that these devices are designed to be worn on the body and not carried.
Wearable devices are also designed to augment knowledge and learning by enhancing users
experience. By design these are miniature electronic devices composed of multiple sensors
controlled by a microcontroller. The sensors can for example sense movement, physiological
signals, atmospheric changes like temperature and humidity. The most common sensors
found in modern wearable devices are accelerometers and gyroscopes. Lifestyle, health moni-
toring, fitness monitoring, entertainment, gaming and industrial support wearable devices
cannot provide the wide range of features without these sensors.
• Health monitoring—devices embedded with sensors which can detect changes in the physio-
logical signals of the body. These devices can be worn permanently by the user.
• Fitness monitoring—devices intended to enhance sports and fitness related activities
through monitoring and tracking. Unlike health monitoring these devices are not intended
to be worn by the user at all times.
• Lifestyle—general purpose wearable articles like smart watches and smart clothing which
can provide cellular, internet connectivity etc.
• Entertainment—wearable devices that can stream audio and video. The devices in this cate-
gory can be wireless headphones, speakers, and wearable displays with the ability of connect-
ing to wide range of entertainment systems like smart TV’s, digital media players, home
theatre systems etc.
• Gaming—devices designed to enhance user experience during gameplay. Advanced devices
are intended to create an immersive augmented environment through the use of 3D head
wearable and walkable surround displays.
• Industrial support—devices that fall in this category are designed to aid the user in perform-
ing their task safely while increasing productivity and efficiency. These devices are intended
to be worn by professionals in an industrial setting.
Consumers can purchase an internet capable version of almost every home appliance; but
many devices still do not possess the ability nor the resources required for the provision of
security. Devices that possess poor physical security, authentication, encryption, interfaces
can become a target of spoofing, key theft and identity theft. Conventional security algorithms
rely on stored cryptographic keys. If the keys are exposed then the system and its data is com-
promised. The ICMetric technology aims to resolve the issue of key theft by using the features
of a device to create a device identification which can then be used for cryptographic key
generation.
This paper studies the ICMetric technology as a key theft deterrent and as a basis for crypto-
graphic services. The paper proposes a security framework that targets devices communicating
in the multiparty environment. The research aims to make four essential contributions.
• The first contribution is a demonstration of how an accelerometer and gyroscope bias which
can be used to generate a device ICMetric.
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• The second contribution of the research is an authentication scheme that can be used to
authenticate individual devices by using their ICMetric. This is a particular challenge as
essential properties need to be preserved.
• The third contribution of the research is the creation of a group ICMetric that is computed
by using a device ICMetric. The challenge is computing the group ICMetric without trans-
mitting the individual device ICMetric.
• The fourth contribution of the research is a scheme that generates a symmetric key for the
group. The scheme is based on prominent cryptographic primitives which facilitate in gener-
ating keys of various sizes. This implies that the scheme is adaptable to the varying needs and
resources of a device.
The paper has been structured by first introducing wearable devices and related work that
is happening in the field of IoT. The paper then introduces the ICMetric technology and
shows how a device ICMetric can be generated using the accelerometer and gyroscope sensors.
The paper presents a detailed study of the proposed scheme by providing the imprinting,
authentication, group ICMetric generation and the key generation algorithm. The paper con-
cludes with the simulation results and outcomes of the study.
2 Related work
A recent study on consumer devices in the IoT shows that devices are being sold with little or
no security provision [1]. Those devices that do have security services have been poorly
designed. This creates the compelling case that security for IoT devices is of utmost impor-
tance and needs a fresh approach to ensure the highest levels of security. Given below is a
broad classification of wearable devices.
Recent research shows the capabilities of consumer wearable devices and also identifies bar-
riers to their adoption [2]. The authors first explain the capabilities of wearable health devices
and also bring to light three prominent issues related to these wearables i.e. safety, reliability
and security. The authors highlight that a well-coordinated cyber-attack could lead to data
being compromised, lost or distorted.
Wearable devices are being used and experimented in a variety of healthcare related appli-
cation [3] [4] [5]. Although the applications are novel they lack security implementations
which is a concern since the applications target healthcare applications of body wearables. In
another research authors present a study on how wearable devices can improve working of
challenging environments like hospital wards [6]. They present a case study in which they con-
clude that wearable devices would enhance the level of usability and context awareness. The
authors have identified four security challenges facing wearable devices i.e. confidentiality,
authentication, hostile environment and device network security. A recent research by Kumar
et al [7] studies fall detection through inertial sensing. The authors design a wearable device
embedded with an accelerometer, gyroscope and Bluetooth. Being a health monitoring sensor
the system continuously senses motion related variables, but the system lacks any form of secu-
rity implementation.
Authentication is a basic requirement for any security system. Researchers have developed
a scheme which can detect the wearer of a wearable device by using a bioelectrical impedance
signal [8]. The research shows that it is possible to use a wrist wearable health sensor called the
Shimmer sensor to uniquely identify a user through their physiological signals [9]. The pro-
posed scheme possesses a 98% successful authentication rate but the scheme does not offer
other necessary security services like integrity and confidentiality. The provision of authentic-
ity alone is a false promise of security and hence the work needs extension.
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A recent research shows that even widely marketed wearable devices can possess poor secu-
rity provisions which makes attacking them an effortless task [10]. The paper studies the Fitbit
tracker that has 96KB RAM and is embedded with an accelerometer sensor, altimeter sensor.
The paper studies the security of the Fitbit tracker and shows that it is possible to attack the
wearable device by exploiting weaknesses in the system. The authors reverse engineer the Fitbit
and observe that it lacks security provisions. For instance the tracker transmits user credentials
in plain text. Besides this any HTTP data processing that takes place is also in plaintext. The
authors also demonstrate that counterfeit data can be generated and injected into the tracker
by attaching it to moving objects like the wheel of a car. Authenticating wearable devices using
body and gait recognition is a concept which has been explored [11] [12]. Chauhan et al. [13]
in their paper design a security scheme for the latest optical wearable device Google Glass. The
authors present an unobtrusive security scheme that uses multiple user gestures to establish
the authenticity of the user. Although the concept is interesting, it has a weakness that it
requires user intervention for authenticity. The other weakness of the scheme is that the user
should have prior experience with the device for improved accuracy.
Presently two forms of security implementations targeting security for wearable devices
have been identified [14]. The first form of security attempts to authenticate the user wearing
the device. The second form of security for wearable devices aims to identify the device and
thus secure it. Research on the emerging ICMetric technology proves that it is both possible
and recommended to use the device features for identifying a device [15]. The technology has
been researched by coupling with a Shimmer sensor for the provision of security in a single
user environment. Tests prove that the scheme can offer authentication, confidentiality and
integrity in a resource constrained environment.
Cryptographic keys are a crucial part of a security algorithm which is why they are kept
secret. If the keys are exposed then the security of the system can be compromised. A technol-
ogy that has been experimented with as a novel root of trust is Physically Unclonable Func-
tions (PUF). A PUF is a one way function that is based on a physical property and also holds
the quality that it is unclonable [16]. When a PUF is provided an input it produces an unpre-
dictable output that is based on a unique physical system characteristic. Thus a PUF is a chal-
lenge response function that is simple to evaluate but is difficult to predict. These qualities
exist due to the fact that PUF’s are embodied in a physical structure that is beyond the control
of even device manufacturers. If a PUF is given input (challenge) a standard stimulus, then
each PUF instantiation will produce a unique response. Early research [17] on optical PUF
showed that when a stationary scattering medium is placed in the path of a laser beam then a
unique splatter pattern is created which is a repeatable device response. This research was the
foundation of the PUF technology but had limited applications owing to design complexity.
MEMS sensors are also suitable for PUF implementation. When a sensor is embedded onto
the main chip it introduces variations(bias) that are beyond the control of even the manufac-
turer. This means that it is not possible to create two chips that behave the same even if the
underlying technology and methods remain the same. Experiments on PUF have shown
that the technology can be used for the provision of cryptographic services. This creates hard-
ware entangled cryptography since the features used are often based on variability in chip
manufacturing [18].
3 Integrated Circuit Metric (ICMetric)
In an age when computing power has become not only common but also cheap, cryptogra-
phers are trying to stay ahead of attackers by increasing key sizes. Often the purpose of increas-
ing the key size is to make it computationally infeasible for an attacker to brute force the keys.
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Keys are often stored on the system, which makes them a target for attackers. Any effort to
increase the key size as a way to protect the system is rendered useless if the system is success-
fully attacked and the keys are captured.
Traditional device fingerprinting techniques are designed to enable system identification
but can also be used to identify users on the web. Broadly these can be placed in one of two
models either client based or server based [19]. In client based method; the device features are
extracted by installing a software on the target system. The problem with this method is that
installing a software requires user permission which may not always be possible since many
users and organizations prohibit software installations. Installing a software is also not
favoured as it may conceal malware in a seemingly meaningful application.
When using the server based method a software installation is not required because device
identifications are generated by gathering device characteristics which are readily available
and do not require user permission. The problem with this technique is that the device identi-
fications are assembled using relatively simpler features which do not ensure diversity and
entropy. Features used in the server method can be extracted and reproduced by attackers thus
aiding spoofing.
IoT devices are rooted in the physical world while communications happen over a network.
A threat actor in the IoT could be an internal or external entity, while the attack could be
intentional or accidental. When a device in the IoT is compromised then critical data can be
captured, lives can be lost and disruptions can be caused as interconnected devices and systems
fail.
The Integrated Circuit Metric (ICMetric) technology has been conceived as an alternative
method to stored keys and as a basis for cryptographic services [20] [21]. The unique concept
and design of the ICMetric technology does not limit its use as an alternative method to stored
keys. The technology can also be used as a basis for key generation and for preventing imper-
sonation and spoofing based attacks on computation systems. By using the ICMetric technol-
ogy there is no need to store the keys or any associated templates because the ICMetric and
keys are generated when required and discarded thereafter. Doing so discourages attackers
since there is no cryptographic key present on the system.
Incorporating the ICMetric technology into group communications ensures that only
trusted parties form part of the group setting. Thus any device that is not part of the established
ICMetric group is considered a malicious entity.
3.1 ICMetric generation
The ICMetric technology has been designed as an additional security layer in the existing com-
munication architecture hence there is no need to rewrite communication architectures.
ICMetric is a patented technology and research has shown that it can be used for key genera-
tion [22] [20]. The ICMetric layer conceals single and multiparty systems with a protective
layer so that any communications to and from the system are based on ICMetric security. Fig
1 is an IoT architecture with the ICMetric layer. The proposed architecture is an adaptation of
the IoT architecture proposed by Suo et al [23]. By using the ICMetric technology a device fin-
gerprint (called an ICMetric) is created which is then used to generate the cryptographic keys
of the system. The ICMetric of a device is generated by first measuring unique system features
under a standard stimulus. The system features are then processed statistically to produce cre-
dentials that are combined to produce a final ICMetric. Provision of cryptographic services is
then based on this established ICMetric.
Unlike conventional device fingerprints, the ICMetric is generated by using both hardware
and software features. If the hardware or software environment of a device is maliciously
On the security of consumer wearables devices in the IoT
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Fig 1. ICMetric based IoT architecture.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195487.g001
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tampered in anyway then the generated ICMetric is different from the original. The ICMetric
of a device should possesses certain qualities which add to the complexity of the generation
and validation process. The ICMetric must hold the following essential properties:
• The ICMetric must be generated when required and discarded thereafter.
• The ICMetric cannot be stored on a system.
• The ICMetric cannot be transmitted or communicated even to trusted parties.
• The ICMetric cannot be directly used as a cryptographic key.
• The ICMetric should be composed of device features that cannot be predicted or spoofed.
The ICMetric generation [22] [20] is a two phase process i.e. calibration phase and opera-
tion phase.
3.1.1 MEMS based ICMetric generation. In this paper MEMS sensors have been studied
for the creation of a device ICMetric. To generate an ICMetric for a device which is embedded
with MEMS sensors a standard stimulus is provided as input. The sensor responds to the stim-
ulus and provides an output that is reflective of the underlying bias in the sensor. Thus the sen-
sor bias is a unique feature for the ICMetric generation. To establish the device ICMetric the
obtained responses to a stimulus are subjected to statistical measures. The statistical measures
include confidence interval, standard deviation, interquartile range and skewness. The statisti-
cal indicators create credentials which can be combined to generate a unique device ICMetric.
The combination of individual credentials has been discussed in section 3.3 of the paper.
3.2 Calibration phase
In the calibration phase, feature values are read from the device under the specified stimulus.
The values are tabulated and frequencies are computed based on the readings provided by the
device. After this the unimodal distributions are generated for each feature. Statistical values
are generated from the unimodal distribution. Thus the calibration phase is applied to extract
the desired feature values and generate a unimodal distribution. The statistical values serve as
credentials that form the device ICMetric. Thus the purpose of the calibration phase is to
establish the basic feature values required for the creation of a final ICMetric through the oper-
ation phase.
3.3 Operation phase
The operation phase generates a final device ICMetric using the statistical values generated in
the calibration phase. The purpose of the operation phase is to create a final device ICMetric
by applying a function on the established statistical credentials. The ICMetric is generated by
either using the feature addition technique or the feature concatenation technique. In the fea-
ture addition technique, the individual statistical values are added to generate an ICMetric
which is diverse but small in size. The feature concatenation technique generates a device
ICMetric by concatenating the individual statistical values. The resulting number lacks diver-
sity but can be fairly large in size depending on the number of digits per statistical value.
3.4 Statistical analysis of device features
To generate the ICMetric those features are selected which can be represented as a unimodal
distribution (a distribution with one clear peak). This is an essential requirement as it ensures
that the target feature value is not erratic and lies within a deterministic range. The unimodal
distribution is analyzed statistically so that credentials can be obtained for the operation phase.
On the security of consumer wearables devices in the IoT
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Statistical credentials are obtained by determining the mean, standard deviation, confidence
interval, interquartile range and skewness. Each statistical measure is strongly dependent on
the readings obtained from the sensors.
Statisticians often question where the mean would lie in a population based on a certain
confidence level. This type of indication is of particular importance when a curve does not fol-
low the normal distribution. The confidence interval determines the interval in which the pop-
ulation mean would lie based on a confidence level [24]. To generate the ICMetric we use the
95% confidence interval. If X is the mean, σ is the standard deviation and n is the total number
of observations then the confidence interval CI is dependent on a two sided multiplier 1.96.
The confidence interval is given by:
95% CI ¼ X  1:96
s
ffiffiffi
n
p ð1Þ
Each statistical measure gives important insight into the readings obtained from the sensor.
For instance the mean of a population shows where an average reading would lie in the popu-
lation. The standard deviation indicates how widely dispersed the readings are compared to
the population mean. Hence a low standard deviation indicates that the data points are close
to the mean.
4 Determining a sensor bias
4.1 MEMS sensors
Micro Electrical and Mechanical System (MEMS) is a technology that mimics conventional
electrical and mechanical systems at a micro scale. There are many MEMS based sensors that
are being embedded into modern smartphones, laptops, vehicles and wearable devices. The
most widely used and best examples of MEMS sensors are the accelerometer and the gyro-
scope. Accelerometers are designed to measure the acceleration of an object, while gyroscopes
measure angular velocity.
MEMS sensors possess a bias that affects their functioning. A sensor bias is defined as the
difference between the test result and the expected result [25]. Hence the bias in a measuring
instrument is the result of single or multiple systematic errors in the system. There are many
bias inducing factors for example the fabrication process where slight stresses are introduced
when a sensor is mounted onto the main board. Even the smallest imperfections in MEMS
sensors has an impact on the accuracy and precision of the sensor. Calibrations attempt to
compensate for the error in the readings by incorporating a linear value into the raw values
obtained from the sensor but fail to fully eliminate the bias. Research has proven that it is both
possible and recommended to use this sensor bias for identifying a device [26] [27] [28] [29]
[30].
4.2 Accelerometer and gyroscope offset measurement
The ICMetric should be generated without user intervention and the identification should be
repeatable. These requirements influence the choice of sensors and the choice of stimulus. A
repeatable offset can only be produced if a device experiences the same stimulus for the entire
duration of the bias identification process. To determine the accelerometer and gyroscope bias
both devices must be put on a stable surface free from movement, rotation and vibration.
Hence the datum point for the accelerometer and the gyroscope is 0 m/sec2 and 0 deg/sec
respectively. To extract the accelerometer and gyroscope bias, a body wearable device is
required which is equipped with the sensors. The Shimmer sensor is a Bluetooth ready,
On the security of consumer wearables devices in the IoT
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wearable health device which is equipped with a range of sensors like EMG, ECG, GSR, mag-
netometer, tri axial accelerometer and tri axial gyroscope.
The experimental setup consists of 5 identical shimmer sensors placed on a vibration free
surface. The experiment aims to prove that a sufficient bias exists in each sensor and that the
statistical characteristics vary between identical sensors. To generate a consistent ICMetric,
1500 individual axis readings were obtained from the accelerometer and gyroscope. The read-
ings are obtained at regular intervals in a CSV file that holds both RAW and calibrated read-
ings from the accelerometer and the gyroscope. The RAW readings are uncalibrated and have
no associated unit which is why they cannot be used for determining the bias. Experiments
prove that each sensor possesses a unique bias which can be used to generate the ICMetric of a
device. Collecting 1500 readings from a sensor requires time which is why experiments were
conducted with smaller data sets. Repeated experiments have shown that statistical stability is
attained at 300 readings. Fig 2 shows the calibrated accelerometer and gyroscope readings
Fig 2. Calibrated unimodal distributions for two different devices evaluating x-axis (a) accelerometer (b) accelerometer (c) gyroscope (d)
gyroscope.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195487.g002
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obtained from two different devices for 1500 readings. The graphs show that each sensor pos-
sesses a different bias even when the axis is the same.
A statistical analysis of the unimodal distributions is necessary to prove that there is suffi-
cient bias required to generate a unique ICMetric. Analysis shows that sensors from different
devices will generate unique statistical credentials. All devices in the setup demonstrated that
they possess a unique operational signature when subjected to a standard stimulus. Owing to
limitation of space we provide only a small snapshot of the statistical analysis. Table 1 shows
how the statistical credentials change even though the stimulus and sensor axis remains the
same. The statistical measures are obtained by processing 1500 sensor readings per axis. The
confidence interval and a p-value has been calculated using single factor Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA). The obtained p-value is 0 which shows there is significant difference between two
sets of readings.
5 Scheme design
Wearable devices in the IoT can be attacked in many ways. Many wearable devices do not pos-
sess adequate resources or even the ability to secure the user, data and the device. Some wear-
able devices are intended to provide health services in which case the importance of security is
paramount. Attackers often use eavesdropping to intercept traffic which can then lead to a
range of other attacks. The proposed scheme allows a number of wearable devices to commu-
nicate in a group environment. To control the group and its entities the scheme requires the
installation of a Key Generation Center (KGC). All devices in the group are ICMetric capable
and the group adheres to the properties of the ICMetric technology. While designing the
scheme it is assumed that all communications happen through secure channels. Basing the
communication on secure channels prevents eavesdropping of communications. Fig 3 shows
the basic system model. The proposed scheme is designed to secure wearable devices in the
group setting. The scheme is founded on the ICMetric technology and composed of five differ-
ent phases i.e. device imprinting, device authentication, group ICMetric generation, symmet-
ric key generation and confidentiality. Table 2 provides a description of the symbols and their
meaning in the scheme. The following section provides details of the individual phases of the
security scheme.
5.1 Device imprinting
The first step for establishing the group is imprinting [31]. The step is aimed at resolving the
issue of establishing trust between two distrusting devices. The process mimics the duckling
Table 1. Statistical analysis of the normal distribution for two different devices embedded with an accelerometer and gyroscope.
Device A Device B
Accelerometer
x-axis
Confidence Interval 0.003450 0.003769
Standard Deviation 0.069307 0.075711
Inter Quartile Range 0.089109 0.089109
Mean -0.291961 -0.746236
Skewness 0.022999 2.325030
Gyroscope
y-axis
Confidence Interval 0.866212 0.197496
Standard Deviation 17.397349 3.966596
Inter Quartile Range 22.34432 4.029304
Mean -75.569276 -77.463322
Skewness -0.079076 1.511550
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195487.t001
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imprinting phase where a newborn duckling establishes a pattern with its parents. When a
device wishes to join a group it will first need to register with the KGC. The KGC is responsible
for coordinating and supporting the presence of the group and its individual members. When
a device wishes to join the group, the device will compute a hash of its ICMetric icmd and send
it in plaintext to the KGC as follows:
h ¼ hashðicmdÞ ð2Þ
This value of h is discarded by the device but is stored by the KGC for future authentication.
Fig 3. Basic system model for wearable devices communicating in the presence of a KGC.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195487.g003
Table 2. A description of the symbols used in the scheme.
Symbol Meaning
 Bitwise exclusive OR
— Concatenation
d e Ceiling function
ich Hashed ICMetric
s 128 bit random salt
icmd, icmKGC ICMetric of device and KGC respectively
ICMg ICMetric of the group
IDx Identity associated with device x
C Iteration count; minimum 1000
kLen Length of master key in bits
hlen Digest size of hash function
be(x) 32-bit encoding of integer x. Significant bit appears on left
mk Master key
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195487.t002
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5.2 Device authentication
To prove authenticity, the device will compute a hash of h and a plaintext temporary salt stemp
issued by the KGC. The device will respond by computing:
h1 ¼ hashðhþ stempÞ ð3Þ
The KGC will compute the same and compare the resulting value with that provided by the
device. If both values are identical then the device will be authenticated. Upon successful
authentication each device will be allocated a unique identity ID, which will help in establish-
ing the group ICMetric.
5.3 Group ICMetric generation
A major goal of the proposed scheme is to form a group ICMetric. The purpose of forming a
group ICMetric is to provide an identification to the established group. It is based on the
ICMetric technology so that a group fingerprint can be created that is authentic and based on
a physical root. The group identification could have been based on a device identification
(serial numbers, MAC address, etc) but this has been avoided as these features can be spoofed.
Generating the group ICMetric is a challenging task because this identification has to be based
on the ICMetric of the constituent devices. The challenge lies in the fact that the ICMetric can-
not be transmitted even to trusted entities. If the group ICMetric is generated without taking
input from the individual group members then a group identity is generated that is not a true
identification of the group and its constituent members.
To generate the group ICMetric without exposing the individual ICMetric we use Shamir’s
Secret Sharing scheme. This scheme allows a number of individual members/ devices to con-
struct the secret group ICMetric.
To generate the group ICMetric the devices in the group will be sent a temporary salt stemp
by the KGC. This will be used by the device to generate a hash by adding the icmd and stemp as
follows:
ich ¼ hashðicmd þ stempÞ ð4Þ
Thus the KGC will receive ID and ich pairs i.e. (IDx, ichx). The responses obtained from the
individual devices will be used to form the secret share points required for constructing the
group ICMetric. The responses obtained from the individual devices will be used to form the
secret share points required for constructing the group ICMetric.
ðID1; ich1Þ; ðID2; ich2Þ; . . . ; ðIDt; ichtÞ ð5Þ
The secret group ICMetric is constructed by using Lagrage interpolation. Lagrange polynomial
is used with the previously assembled share points. The group ICMetric is assembled using the
following polynomial:
ICMg ¼
Yt
j¼1
IDj
Xt
i¼1;i6¼j
ichi
ðichj   ichiÞ
Qt
j¼1;j6¼iðichi   ichjÞ
ð6Þ
Where t is the number of individual pairs used for establishing the group ICMetric.
5.4 Password-Based Key Derivation Function
A password is an identifying phrase which can be composed of a combination of alphabets,
numbers and special characters. User defined passwords do not possess enough entropy due
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to which they cannot be used as cryptographic keys. Password-Based Key Derivation Function
(PBKDF) is a scheme that generates keys from secret values such as a password [32]. PBKDF
uses a cryptographic hash or an HMAC with a salt to generate a key which is used for the pro-
vision of security services. Since PBKDF use a salt to generate a key it defeats rainbow table
based attacks.
PBKDF is also based on an iteration count C which is intended to increase the amount of
computation needed to derive the key. Increasing the computation makes brute force difficult
but also effects the amount of computation required for the legitimate user. The aim while
choosing the number of iterations is to increase the difficulty of attacks while ensuring low key
generation impact. The NIST standard on PBKDF and other proposals recommend a mini-
mum iteration count of 1000 iterations because this has minimum adverse effect on system
performance. Higher number of iterations have been proposed in varying applications. A
gradual increment in the iteration count has been recommended as and when computation
power becomes available. When this is possible a maximum iteration count of 10,000,000 has
been proposed but with the caution that the user-perceived performance is not of affected.
The design considerations of a PBKDF bears close resemblance to the conditions of the
ICMetric technology. For instance the password is a secret phrase which cannot be transmit-
ted, similarly the ICMetric of a device cannot be transmitted. A quality of the PBKDF is that
the large sized iteration count prevents an attacker from determining the password which in
this case is the group ICMetric ICMg. Fig 4 shows the PBKDF schematic modified according to
the ICMetric technology for the establishment of a symmetric master key. The proposed sys-
tem is based on the NIST PBKDF [32] recommendation.
The proposed scheme uses ICMg to generate a master key mk which is used for confidential-
ity services. kLen is the required length of the master key in bits. The kLen can be modified to
conform with the needs of the target encryption algorithm. The proposed algorithm also takes
as input the digest length hLen. A modifiable key length and hash digest length allows adapt-
ability of the algorithm to upcoming and changing cryptographic requirements. The algorithm
for symmetric key generation using PBKDF is as follows.
if (kLen>232−1)x h
Return with Error
len = kLen/hLen
r = kLen−(len−1)xhLen
for (i = 1 to kLen)
{
Ti = 0
U0 = s || be(i)
for (j = 1 to C)
{
Uj = HMAC(ICMg, Uj−1)
Ti = TiUj
}
}
Return mk = (T1||T2||. . .|| TkLen)
Since all involved parties and the KGC possess the same group ICMetric therefore it can be
concluded that using the group ICMetric will result in a single symmetric key for all parties in
the group.
5.5 IoT encryption/ decryption
After generating the ICMetric based symmetric key the next step is to use the key for the provi-
sion of confidentiality services. Wearable devices in the IoT ecosystem often generate data in
the form of a data stream. To test the confidentiality services of the system we use the AES and
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Rabbit Stream Cipher [33] [34]. The Rabbit stream cipher is a recognized eSTREAM cipher
with high throughput. The purpose of the eSTREAM project was to identify promising stream
ciphers which can be widely adopted. The scheme has also been tested with 128 bit and 256 bit
AES variants. The aim while choosing encryption schemes was to select schemes that offer
high levels of confidentiality without the resource demand.
6 Implementation and outcomes
The system has been implemented and tested on Intel Core i5 3.4 Ghz processor computer
with 6GB RAM. The MEMS readings were obtained from the Shimmer sensor while authenti-
cation, group ICMetric generation, key generation and confidentiality scheme has been
Fig 4. The PBKDF schematic showing the generation of a symmetric key using the group ICMetric.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195487.g004
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implemented in Bloodshed Dev-C and MATLAB. The cryptographic functionalities were pro-
vided by the OpenSSL cryptographic library.
The system has been divided into five subcategories each targeting a different cryptographic
service. The system is composed of the following modules:
• ICMetric generation—A module dedicated to generating an ICMetric from the sensor
readings.
• Authentication—A module designed to authenticate the individual devices in the group
environment.
• Group ICMetric Generation—A module dedicated to generating a group ICMetric using the
Shamir Secret Sharing Scheme.
• Key Generation—A PBKDF scheme for the generation of varying conventional key sizes i.e.
128, 256, 512, 1024 bits.
• Confidentiality—Two stream cipher modules i.e. Rabbit stream cipher and AES (128 and
256 bit).
6.1 Results
The sampling rate for the accelerometer and gyroscope in the Shimmer is 51.2Hz. Once the
readings are obtained from the sensor in a CSV file the readings are used to generate the final
ICMetric. Implementation of the algorithm takes 0.27512 seconds to generate an ICMetric
using both the accelerometer and the gyroscope. Once the ICMetric has been generated the
device will use authentication services to get itself authenticated using the ICMetric. The
authentication scheme contains two occurrences of the SHA256 function. The authentication
module takes 5 × 10−3 seconds to execute. The Group ICMetric generation is based on Shamir
Secret Sharing Scheme. This module requires 1.5 × 10−3 seconds to execute completely. Fig 5
shows the time required by the individual modules of the scheme.
Fig 5. Time taken by the system modules.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195487.g005
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The PBKDF is influenced by two parameters i.e the key size and the number of iterations.
To study the performance of this algorithm four common key sizes were generated using vary-
ing number of iterations. The generated key sizes are 128, 256, 512, 1024 bits while the tested
iteration count is 1000, 2000 and 4000. Table 3 shows the time taken by the PBKDF when sub-
jected to varying key sizes and iteration count.
A time study of the keys generation module shows that the 256-bit key with 4000 iterations
requires the most time to operate. Increasing the number of iterations and the key size impacts
the time required by the system. Fig 6 shows a change in time required as the key size and the
number of iterations increases.
The confidentiality module has been implemented with two widely recognized encryption
algorithms i.e. Rabbit stream cipher and AES. The AES encryption module is composed of two
variants i.e. 128 bit and 256 bit. The 128 bit variant requires 3.6 × 10−6 seconds to run; while
the 256 bit variant requires 51 × 10−6 seconds. The rabbit stream cipher requires a 128 bit key
and a 64 bit initialization vector to run and requires only 7 × 10−6 seconds to run top down.
Given in Fig 7 is a graph showing the time taken by the individual encryption schemes and
their variants.
6.2 Discussion
The security scheme unifies the ICMetric and prominent cryptographic schemes like Shamir
Secret Sharing, PBKDF, AES and Rabbit to create a system that ensures security for wearable
devices in the IoT. The ICMetric technology deters key theft by using the features of a sensor.
The device ICMetric is generated only when required and discarded thereafter. Readings from
sensors are used to determine the bias and thus generate an identification for the device. The
ICMetric technology is a key theft deterrence technology and also provides device authentica-
tion services. The proposed scheme provides authentication by using the device ICMetric.
When the authentication happens in a group setting we have an environment where only
authenticated devices can communicate and share resources.
Since the designed scheme targets devices in a group setting therefore we propose generat-
ing an identification for the devices that form the group. To overcome the problems associated
with exposure of the individual ICMetric, the scheme uses Shamir Secret Sharing to generate
an ICMetric for the group. This scheme allows the creation of a group ICMetric which is an
Table 3. Time taken by PBKDF with varying key size and iteration count.
Iteration Count Key Size
(bits)
Key Generation Time
(seconds)
1000 128 0.019
256 0.040
512 0.081
1024 0.160
2000 128 0.041
256 0.080
512 0.146
1024 0.310
4000 128 0.093
256 0.166
512 0.328
1024 0.588
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195487.t003
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identification for the group. The presented system uses the group ICMetric to generate a
symmetric key using PBKDF. This module supports attack deterrence through an adaptable
iteration count. The scheme also promotes effortless adaptability to varying key sizes. By incor-
porating cryptographic salts throughout the designed system it deters dictionary based brute
force attacks.
The ICMetric of a device is never communicated thus discouraging man in the middle
attack. To further strengthen the scheme noteworthy cryptographic elements have been incor-
porated like random salts and ephermal keys. Using these architectural elements ensures pro-
tection against replay and impersonation attacks. Provision of strong authentication alone
does not ensure a fully secure system therefore it has been studied in combination with promi-
nent confidentiality schemes like AES and Rabbit.
For the correct functioning of the proposed schemes it is essential that the same ICMetric is
generated time and time again. It is a well-known fact that functioning of MEMS sensors is
affected by a number of factors like aging, environmental impact, heat, electromagnetic radia-
tions and physical damage. These factors will influence the functioning of the device and ulti-
mately the production of the ICMetric. Methods for compensating the sensor drift could be
incorporated to ensure the correct generation of an ICMetric. Here one may be tempted to
base the device identification on a simpler feature like a device identification. This in our opin-
ion is not recommended as identifications are easily obtained (often printed on the exterior of
a device).
Fig 6. Graph showing time (seconds) taken by Rabbit and two variants of AES.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195487.g006
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6.3 Result comparison
Studying the PBKDF algorithm with the ICMetric technology is a novel concept that has not
been explored previously. The simulation results of the proposed symmetric key scheme is
compared to a healthcare sensing system based on the ICMetric technology [15]. The system is
a one to one scheme that provides ICMetric based authentication and access control. The sys-
tem also offers AES based encryption by using symmetric keys. Since the system was intended
for one to one communication therefore the scheme is not constituent of a group ICMetric
module. The scheme is initiated with the establishment of an ICMetric, followed by generation
of the symmetric key. This symmetric key is then used to provide confidentiality services. The
authors have simulated the proposed scheme and the projected time consumption is similar to
that of our scheme. Authentication services and key exchange is carried out by a Secure
Remote Password scheme and hence the authors have not provided a dedicated module for
authentication. Table 4 provides the time taken by this scheme and the rivalling scheme also
based on ICMetric technology. As the contending scheme does not simulate all modules there-
fore absent details have been represented with a dash.
7 Conclusion
Wearable devices with internet connectivity is a recent advancement in the field of computing.
Wearable devices can have many purposes ranging from health monitoring to entertainment.
Where wearable devices offer much advantage, a hurdle in their wide adoption are security
concerns. This paper presents the design and implementation of a security scheme for multiple
wearable devices in the IoT. Cryptographic algorithms are often based on secret keys. If the
keys of a system are captured then this can result in the system being exposed. The ICMetric
Fig 7. Graph showing time (seconds) taken to generate various key variants.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195487.g007
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technology is a novel concept that eliminates the need for stored keys. By using the ICMetric
technology keys are generated when required and discarded thereafter. This paper studies the
design and implementation of an ICMetric based system that uses the features of a device to
create secret group keys which are then used for cryptographic services. The accelerometer
and gyroscope bias in sensors has been used to determine the ICMetric identification of a
device. Once the device ICMetric is generated, Shamir Secret Sharing scheme has been used to
generate an ICMetric for the group. This group identification is used to generate a symmetric
key for the group using PBKDF. In the paper experiments have been conducted to determine
the relationship between the key size and the number of iterations required for the generation
of a symmetric key. Confidentiality services of the designed system are based on the AES 128,
256 and the Rabbit stream cipher. The scheme is based by integrating strong cryptographic ele-
ments so that the scheme provides the highest levels of security with a limited resource
demand. The designed scheme function without human intervention thus the ICMetric and
associated system components operate without the need for user input. Using this algorithm
has the added advantage that the group ICMetric can be generated with varying number of
group members present. Thus to assemble the group ICMetric a predetermined set of group
members do not have to be present. The proposed scheme can be adapted to other challenging
environments where there are many systems in a multiparty environment. Simulation results
of the proposed schemes shows that the ICMetric technology can be used to provide security
to devices that communicate in a group setting. The ICMetric technology deters key theft and
forms a basis for cryptographic services but does not add to the resource demand of the target
system.
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